Debunking myths on military “utility” of AP mines
Background
Heightened insecurity in Europe related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have prompted some States Parties[1] to consider withdrawing from the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Politicians promoting such a move claim landmines will serve as an effective deterrent to Russian aggression by protecting borders and boosting defensive capabilities in case of an eventual invasion. They point to anecdotal hearsay on use of antipersonnel (AP) mines in Ukraine to demonstrate tactical military utility without providing evidence-based analysis to back up their assertions. On the other hand, the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted based on the premise that there was actually very limited military utility of AP mines, and any usefulness they might have was far outweighed by their clear and massive humanitarian impact. As well, alternative modern technologies are available for border protection and area-denial today that render Cold War-era AP mines obsolete. But ultimately, decisions on using particular weapons should take into account the full scope of human security, including the heavy and long-term humanitarian impact of landmines on civilians.
This briefing paper provides a framework for countering the key security-related arguments being used to promote withdrawals from the MBT. The specific toll AP mines take on civilians and communities has been well-documented and is not addressed in detail here.
Myth 1: AP mines have significant military utility, including for border defense
AP mines were traditionally used as part of an planned obstacle system intended to slow the advance of opposing forces, channel an opponent’s troops into an area in which they can be targeted with direct fire, provide protection for defensive positions in combination with defensive fire, and impede the removal of anti-tank mines. Yet major advances in military technology since the mid-1990s, including armed drones, all-weather tracking sensors, internet-based battlefield communications, and integrated electronic warfare systems enabling the detection of personnel movements and the rapid application of accurate fire at long distances have rendered AP mines an obsolete weapon for these purposes.
Even by the time the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated in 1997, the limited utility of AP mines was already widely recognized. Indeed, the willingness of dozens of militaries to give up a weapon that had been a standard part of their arsenal helped pave the way for rapid negotiation of the treaty. A 1996 study by military officers[2] commissioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) examined the military effectiveness of AP mines in 26 conflicts since World War II and found that “that AP mines have proven to be weapons of severely limited utility”[3] which “is far outweighed by the appalling humanitarian consequences of their use in actual conflicts.”[4] One UK General noted, “there is no case known where AP mines as such have influenced a campaign, a battle or even a skirmish in any decisive way,”[5] and a former US Marine Corps Commandant affirmed that in his experience in Korea, Southeast Asia, and Iraq, he knew of ‘‘no situation where our use of mine warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought him into a destructive pattern. I’m not aware of any operational advantage from [the] broad deployment of mines.”[6]
The report went on to note that “AP mines can frequently become as much of a liability as an asset.”[7] It warned of the cost to one’s own forces in terms of casualties and loss of tactical flexibility as mines laid against enemy forces subsequently prevent movement of, or inflict casualties on, one’s own troops in these same areas. Landmines may also create a false sense of security around defensive positions given the capacity available to breach minefields in a matter of hours with relative ease.[8] The study found that AP mines, at best, slowed the advance of opposing forces, and when used against forces equipped with military equipment intended for breaching minefields, the study concluded bluntly that “the value of AP mines has not been demonstrated.”[9] The report also notes that the lack of proper maintenance and surveillance has “rendered many minefields useless, whether they were created for border control, the protection of bases or the protection of certain infrastructure installations.”[10]
Countries bordering Russia have suggested that mines would be helpful to defend their border against a Russian invasion. But the 1996 ICRC review found that “Establishing, monitoring and maintaining an extensive border minefield is time-consuming, expensive and dangerous.”[11]. Both ICRC reviews concluded that the use of AP mines to prevent infiltration along borders without continuous observation and direct fire, which is not feasible along a lengthy border ,“renders such minefields ineffective.” Again, experts observed that such minefields lend a false sense of security, since they will not prevent infiltration and that “unmanned mined areas may often be the preferred routes of infiltration.”[12] This conclusion is consistent with and confirmed by a 2005 NATO standardization guidance on landmine use.[13]
The countries considering leaving the Mine Ban Treaty point to use of AP mines in Ukraine to support their arguments, but no reliable analysis has been put forward to show their impact in any meaningful, game-changing manner. Russia’s success, for example, in containing the major Ukrainian offensive in 2023 was largely achieved by use of obstacles and deploying huge numbers of Anti-vehicle mines, flooding large areas, and by covering obstacles with heavy defensive fire. The widespread use of modern technologies including remote sensors, armed drones, satellites, and integrated fire systems have replaced and rendered obsolete the role of AP mines in detecting, slowing and inflicting casualties on enemy soldiers on foot, achieving the same goals faster and in a more reliable manner. These are the systems that were deployed by NATO forces and others since the late 1990s as alternatives to AP mines because of the Mine Ban Treaty and for reasons of military efficiency.
The ICRC report also questioned AP mines’ ability to deter or slow an army’s advance when facing an enemy that is willing to accept substantial levels of casualties. The report states that in past conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war, the Korean war and highly-motivated revolutionary struggles, “the utility of AP mines is vastly reduced and forces simply cross the minefields, accepting the risks this entails.”[14] It adds, “History has shown that AP mines … have never yet stopped a determined advancing enemy.”[15] In other words, the deterrent value of mines will not be the same for an opponent willing to accept high loss of personnel as for one that places a higher priority on limiting casualties. Comparisons of the utility of AP mine use across different contexts or armies may therefore be unreliable. In light of the already massive casualties being absorbed by Russian and North Korean forces in the Ukraine conflict, it would appear these militaries are among those that accept high risks for their soldiers and that AP mines would therefore not serve as an effective deterrent to them in another setting.
Myth 2: “Non-persistent” AP mines are “new technology” and “better than other AP mines.”
Some states are claiming that there are “new” mines that self-neutralize or self-destruct after a certain period of time, and that using them would be better than mines without these features. Some countries have implied that they would even be permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Yet the Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively and unequivocally prohibits ALL types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of their predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture. Non-persistent mines are also not “new” technology. The technology dates from 1990s, and no western country has developed updated versions since then.
The option of using “non-persistent” AP mines as a solution to the global landmine problem was widely discussed in 1994-1996[16] and was rejected by the 122 States that negotiated and adopted the MBT in 1997. The primary reason they were ultimately excluded was that the reliability of the proposed “self-destruct” mechanisms or “self-deactivating” features was never demonstrated through credible international testing data. Evidence from use of the mines showed considerable failure rates,[17] meaning the mines failed to self-destruct or the timed self-deactivating feature was not properly activated.
In any case, a failed self-destruct mine or a mine with only a self-neutralizing feature will remain indefinitely and will have to be cleared using the same laborious process required for any other mines. Mines that have failed to self-destruct, but which may have self-deactivated, will have to be treated by deminers as live mines that may potentially explode. They remain dangerous due to their explosive content and still contain intact fuzing systems containing primary explosive.
Even if they function as intended, mines that are designed to self-destruct or deactivate still pose unacceptable risks for civilians as they are no better able to distinguish civilians from combatants when in operation. Civilians in such minefields not only face the danger of triggering mines that are still active or have failed to self-destruct or self-neutralize, but also the danger of those mines randomly self-destructing at unknown times. Given the failure rate for self-destruction, many unexploded mines will remain on the ground with no outward indication of their “safety.” Because of the large quantities of these mines that are typically employed at one time (see below), the danger to civilians could be greater than hand-laid non-self destructing mines.
Unlike traditional hand-emplaced AP mines, most types of “non-persistent” mines are often remotely delivered by aircraft or artillery systems and can be delivered in massive numbers (tens of thousands per day and hundreds of thousands over the period of a conflict). The use of remote delivery systems means that their exact locations will not be known, creating a major challenge for clearance operations. In addition, they are likely to land in areas of thick vegetation, swamps, forests, lakes, rivers and steep terrain, making clearance an even more difficult, dangerous and long-term challenge and leaving civilians exposed to their dangers long after they cease to serve any military purpose.
The delivery systems for remotely delivered AP mines are functionally the same as those used to deliver cluster munitions (i.e. aircraft, rockets and conventional artillery munitions). Yet we know the failure rate of cluster munitions in combat conditions far exceeded the laboratory rate determined by manufacturers due to inconsistent variables such as airspeed, altitude and angle of deployment, or damages caused by release. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that similar failure rates will occur in the deployment phase of remotely delivered AP mines before the mine is in place, in addition to the failure rate of the fuze mechanism itself.
It must be stressed that the long-term use of remotely delivered “non-persistent” mines to protect border areas would not make sense militarily. Their limited life span (often just 15 to 30 days) means that the minefields would have to be repeatedly re-laid, creating great uncertainty about which mines are live and a massive contamination problem. Therefore, despite claims that non-persistent mines are available to reduce civilian casualties, it is unlikely that such mines would be used to protect long borders.
Myth 3: Our country will use mines “responsibly”
Some states argue that their militaries will use mines “responsibly,” and therefore civilians will not be at risk from any eventual use. Yet there is no historical basis on which to assert that mines can be used in a lawful and responsible fashion. The ICRC study’s assessment of use in 26 conflicts demonstrate that “that few instances can be cited where mine use has been consistent with international humanitarian law or, where it exists, military doctrine, … whether by ‘developed’ armies, ‘third-world’ armies or ‘insurgents.’”[18]
Frontlines shift regularly during combat, and there is usually insufficient time to clear mined areas to humanitarian standards when battles move elsewhere. Locations may be recorded, but mines can move over time through flooding or other natural phenomena. Even fences or signposts that are intended to prevent entry into mined areas can also move, fall, or be removed over time. In a conflict situation, civilians may also have no choice but to move through mined areas, especially when fleeing combat. Ultimately, the inherent nature of mines means that wherever they lay and however they are laid, AP mines cannot be aimed at a soldier, and it is therefore virtually impossible to limit their impact to combatants alone.
Myth 4: AP mines are readily available
All NATO countries except the U.S. are party to the Mine Ban Treaty and may therefore not produce, stockpile, or transfer AP mines. The only mines likely to be obtained by NATO countries in northeast Europe are likely to be those from the US stockpile of some 3 million AP mines that had previously been slated for destruction and subject to a transfer ban. ALL of these mines are currently 27 or more years old and depend on batteries that are at least as old and cannot be replaced, raising questions about their reliability. A US official quoted by Human Rights Watch stated in 2014 that “We anticipate that they will start to deteriorate in their ability to be used…starting in about 10 years (i.e. 2024)…and in 10 years after that (i.e. 2034) they’ll be completely unusable.” The well-known impact of cold weather on battery reliability is also likely to further degrade their effectiveness.
Over the longer term, states in northeast Europe might consider restarting production of AP mines on their own, which will require time and considerable financial investment. Some companies have expressed reluctance to invest in new production given the international stigmatization of these weapons and the limited market with a near-global ban. Investment in the production of AP mines is also outlawed in some Mine Ban Treaty countries, so acquiring financial investment may be challenging.
Myth 5: If our opponent is using AP mines, our country should use them too
The use of a weapon of limited military effectiveness by one’s opponent does not require a state to make the same poor strategic and inhumane choice. By joining the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties demonstrated an understanding of the severe humanitarian consequences of AP mines and committed to never using them again for this reason. A country like Russia that remained outside the treaty has, on the contrary, shown a clear disregard for the protection of civilians and an insensitivity to the suffering mines cause. If a country decides to imitate the military tactics of countries like Russia, they would be stooping to the level of their opponent rather than upholding longstanding international norms, calling into question their commitment to the principles of international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. By littering their land with hidden killers, these countries would be putting their own populations’ lives at risk and increasing the timely and the expensive clearance burden.
[1] As of March 2025, the countries publicly discussing withdrawal from the Mine Ban Treaty are Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
[2] ICRC, Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0654-anti-personnel-landmines-friend-or-foe-study-military-use-and-effectiveness-anti, 1996. The conclusions of the study were endorsed by 55 military officers from 19 countries. In 2004, they were further updated with observations from a group of 10 senior officers from 8 countries. ICRC, “Report on observations and conclusions from a review of the ICRC study,” December 2004, https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/friendfoereportobservations30nov1dec2004.pdf.
[3] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 44.
[4] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 73.
[5] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 44.
[6] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 44.
[7] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 45.
[8] For example, the effectiveness of Iraq’s mines had been overestimated by US forces, which later reported: ‘‘Instead of needing 18 hours to break through Iraqi positions as originally calculated, the 1st Infantry Division successfully breached them in 2.’’ ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 40.
[9] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 72.
[10] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 41.
[11] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 71.
[12] ICRC, “Report on observations and conclusions from a review of the ICRC study,” p.2.
[13] NATO Standardization Agency, STANAG 2036 (Edition 6), “Landmine Laying, Marking, Recording and Reporting Procedures”, 2005.
[14] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 43.
[15] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 15.
[16] The results of these discussions led to the inclusion of such AP Mines in the provisions of Amended Protocol II of 1996 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
[17] ICRC, Results of the Montreux Symposium on Anti-Personnel Mines, April 1994, https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/S0020860400078323a.pdf.
[18] ICRC, Friend or Foe, p. 7.